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Abstract
We consider a class of sequential network interdiction problem settings where the interdictor
has incomplete initial information about the network while the evader has complete knowledge
of the network including its structure and arc costs. In each decision epoch, the interdictor can
block (for the duration of the epoch) at most k arcs known to him/her. By observing the evader’s
actions, the interdictor learns about the network structure and costs and thus, can adjust his/her
actions in subsequent decision epochs. It is known from the literature that if the evader is greedy
(i.e., the shortest available path is used in each decision epoch), then under some assumptions
the greedy interdiction policies that block k-most vital arcs in each epoch are efficient and have
a finite regret. In this paper, we consider the evader’s perspective and explore deterministic
“strategic” evasion policies under the assumption that the interdictor is greedy. We first study
the theoretical computational complexity of the evader’s problem. Then we derive basic con-
structive properties of optimal evasion policies for two decision epochs when the interdictor has
no initial information about the network structure. These properties are then exploited for the
design of a heuristic algorithm for a strategic evader in a general setting with an arbitrary time
horizon and any initial information available to the interdictor. Our computational experiments
demonstrate that the proposed heuristic outperforms the greedy evasion policy on several classes
of synthetic network instances under either perfect or noisy information feedback. Finally, some
interesting insights from our theoretical and computational results conclude the paper.
Keywords: network interdiction; incomplete information; shortest path; k-most vital arcs;
strategic evader; arc-disjoint path problem
1. Introduction
Network interdiction is typically posed as a one- or multi-stage decision-making problem in
a network with two decision-makers, an interdictor and an evader. The evader traverses in the
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network (e.g., between two fixed nodes, a source and a destination), while the interdictor aims to
disrupt to the maximum possible extent (or completely stop) the evader’s movement. Perhaps,
the most well-known and studied network interdiction problem is the shortest path interdiction
problem [20], where the interdictor seeks a set of arcs whose removal subject to some budgetary
constraint, maximizes the cost of the shortest path between two specified nodes. That is, the
evader is assumed to move along the shortest path between these nodes. If the interdictor is
allowed to block at most k arcs, then this problem is often referred to as the k-most vital arcs
problem [12]. The shortest path interdiction problem is known to be NP -hard [12]. Neverthe-
less, rather effective exact solution approaches for various versions of the network interdiction
problem exist in the literature, see, e.g., [20, 38].
Network interdiction forms a broad class of deterministic and stochastic optimization prob-
lems with applications mostly arising in the military, law-enforcement and infectious disease
control contexts, see surveys in [13, 35, 36, 37, 39] and the references therein. Perhaps, the earli-
est example of the network interdiction considerations can be found in a now de-classified RAND
report for the U.S. Air Force in 1955 [18], which studied the Soviet railway network. There has
been a substantial increase in the interest for this class of optimization problems since the early
2000’s given concerns with various homeland security issues. Recent examples of real-world
settings, where different types of interdiction models have been applied include nuclear smug-
gling interdiction [3, 27], drug trafficking enforcement [14, 26], border patrol [9], the problem
of interdicting a nuclear-weapon project [8], etc. Furthermore, interdiction models have been
applied for analysis of critical infrastructure systems, see examples of real-life case studies in [9]
for the U.S. strategic petroleum reserve and an electrical transmission grid. A brief overview
of the network interdiction settings in the modern military contexts can also be found in [3].
In the typical shortest path interdiction problem the graph represents an underlying “infil-
tration” or “smuggling” network (with a finite number of possible “infiltration” or “smuggling”
routes, respectively) in which the evader travels or moves the illegal materials. The arc costs may
correspond to appropriately defined detection (or non-detection) probabilities or the amount of
the evader’s effort required to smuggle/move a unit of illegal materials through an arc, while
graph nodes often represent some geographical locations. The interdiction actions correspond
to placing sensors, road/helicopter patrols or actual attacks (in the military contexts) to prevent
successful evasions, see discussions in [3, 35, 36, 39]. Finally, we also refer the reader to [9, 13],
where the authors provide interesting discussions on some practical implications and insights
from various interdiction models in the literature.
While most of the studies in the network interdiction literature consider deterministic set-
tings, a number of more recent works consider the network interdiction problem in stochastic
settings; see, e.g., [17, 29, 21] and the survey in [28]. Typically such models assume that either
the outcomes of interdiction actions are uncertain or there is uncertainty with respect to the
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evader’s actions. Then the interdictor’s objective is to optimize some utility function over the
network, e.g., minimize the expected cost of the maximum-reliability path [29].
In addition, several studies consider multi-stage stochastic interdiction models. One example
is the study by Held et al. [19], who assumes that the network’s configuration itself is subject to
uncertainty. The interdictor attempts to maximize the probability that the minimum path cost
exceeds a given threshold. Since even computing an objective function value is time-consuming
some heuristic algorithms are proposed and their effectiveness is validated numerically.
Furthermore, an interesting dynamic deterministic version of the network interdiction prob-
lem has been recently considered in [33], where the evader can dynamically adjust her1 move-
ment at every node of her path in the network by observing the interdictor’s actions. The
interdictor, in turn, can interdict arcs any time the evader arrives at a node in the network. It
is also assumed that the interdictor has a limited interdiction budget.
The current study is motivated and builds upon recent works of Borrero et al. in [6, 7].
Specifically, in their network model in [6] the interdictor and the evader interact sequentially
over multiple decision epochs (or rounds)2. In each epoch, the interdictor can block at most k
arcs for the duration of the current decision epoch, while the evader is assumed to be greedy,
i.e., in each epoch the evader traverses along the shortest path between two fixed nodes in the
interdicted network. The evader’s loss in each epoch (i.e., her instantaneous loss) is equal to the
cost of the shortest path in the interdicted network. This modeling approach can be justified, for
example, by interdiction and evasion dynamics arising in monitoring and patrolling problems,
where the interdictor has to periodically reallocate his resources over different geographical
locations, see additional discussion in [6].
The key feature of the model in [6] is that the interdictor has incomplete initial information
about the network including its structure and costs, but learns about the network structure
and arc costs by observing the evader’s actions (i.e., the evasion path) in each decision epoch.
The learning component is motivated by practical settings, where the interdictor can observe
the evader’s actions (for example, by using a satellite or a drone), but cannot immediately react
upon those actions; see, e.g., [40]. In particular, it is assumed that this information feedback is
deterministic and perfect that is, the interdictor learns about the existence and the exact costs
of the arcs used by the evader in the previous decision epochs. The quality of an interdiction
policy is measured using either cumulative regret or time stability. The former is defined as the
difference in the total cost (over some predefined finite number of decision epochs) incurred by
the evader under the current interdiction policy against the policy of an oracle interdictor with
1Note that in the remainder of the paper we refer to the interdictor and the evader as “he/his” and “she/her,”
respectively.
2We use the terms “decision epoch” or “round” interchangeably
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prior complete knowledge of the network. Clearly, the oracle interdictor implements an optimal
solution of the k-most vital arcs problem in each decision epoch. Time stability is defined as
the number of rounds that are necessary for the policy to gain sufficient amount of information
in order to implement a solution of the k-most vital arcs problem that is also optimal in the
full information network for the remainder of the time horizon.
The main results of [6] can be summarized as follows. First, it is shown that for their de-
terministic setting, in general, there do not exist policies that perform better than any other
policy for any graph consistent with the initial information available to the interdictor. Thus,
the focus of [6] is on the greedy and robust interdiction policies. They are greedy because they
block a set of the k-most vital arcs from the network known to the interdictor in each round;
they are robust because whenever the exact cost of the arc is not known to the interdictor,
then the policies assume the worst-case scenario for the evader. These policies turn out to be
“efficient” in the following sense: (i) they eventually find and maintain an optimal solution to
the k-most vital arcs problem in the full information network (i.e., an optimal solution of the
oracle interdictor), within a finite number of decision epochs (possibly, instance dependent);
and (ii) this class of policies is not dominated that is, for any possible instance of the initial
information available to the interdictor and any policy that is not greedy and robust, there
exists a greedy and robust policy that is strictly better (with respect to either the cumulative
regret or time stability) than the aforementioned non-greedy and/or non-robust policy for some
graph that is consistent with the initial information available to the interdictor.
Property (i) of greedy and robust policies also implies that they have a finite regret. Fur-
thermore, these policies detect when the instantaneous regret reaches zero in real time, i.e.,
when an optimal solution of the oracle interdictor is found. In addition to these attractive the-
oretical properties, the results of computational experiments in [6] also confirm the superiority
of greedy and robust interdiction policies against several other benchmark policies. Finally, in
[7] the authors generalize the theoretical results and greedy policies from [6] for a more general
class of max-min linear mixed-integer problems.
Note that in [6, 7], similar to the vast majority of the related interdiction literature, the
authors focus on the interdictor’s perspective. However, given that the outlined greedy and ro-
bust interdiction policies are rather intuitive and very simple to implement (which is important
for their applicability in practical applications) and have attractive theoretical properties, it is
natural to explore the evader’s perspective. In particular, if we assume that the interdictor is
greedy and robust, what are good strategic policies for the evader against greedy and robust
interdiction policies? Do such policies have any interesting structural properties? How can they
be constructed? These research questions form the main focus of the current study.
Admittedly, our modeling approach is somewhat stylized and clearly not without limitations.
However, our goal is to gain insights about the structure and properties of the evasion policies
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that are effective against greedy and robust interdictors. We envision that the results of the
study can be further exploited for the development of more advanced interdiction models and
policies, where the evader follows more sophisticated behavior than that typically assumed in
the standard interdiction models.
In this paper, we consider the deterministic setting similar to [6] with an additional modifi-
cation. Specifically, with respect to the initial information available to the interdictor, in [6] it
is assumed that for some arcs the interdictor is aware only about some upper and lower bounds
on their costs. In contrast, we assume that whenever the existence of the arc is known to the
interdictor initially, then its cost is also known, which in fact, is a less favorable scenario for the
evader, whose perspective we consider. Furthermore, recall that in the considered setting the
feedback is perfect that is, whenever the arcs is used by the evader, its existence and precise
cost information is revealed to the interdictor. Therefore, under our rather mild assumption on
the initial information available to the interdictor, the greedy and robust interdiction policies
of [6, 7] reduce to simply the greedy ones.
As mentioned earlier, the evader’s perspective is discussed by relatively few studies. In
particular, Sanjab et al. [30, 31] study a one-stage zero-sum game, where the evader transports
products between two specified nodes in the network and attempts to minimize the expected
delivery time. Furthermore, the authors focus on a bounded rationality model, that is, the risk
level of a selected path or the merit of a selected attack location can be perceived subjectively
by the decision-makers. However, in our setting the bounded rationality of the evader is ad-
dressed by considering strategic decisions in a multi-period deterministic setting. Additionally,
in contrast to [30, 31] we assume limited information about the network’s structure, but not
uncertainty in the evader’s (or interdictor’s) decisions.
Eventually, our formulation of the evader’s problem can be viewed as a particular case of
online combinatorial optimization problem with sleeping experts [23], which is a generalization
of the classical multi-armed bandit formulation; see, e.g., [4]. The problem with stochastic loss
functions and adversarial availability of actions is discussed in [1, 24]. The evader’s problem
is related to the online adversarial shortest path problem [1]. Nevertheless, uniform mixing
assumption [1] does not hold for deterministic strategies and the notion of regret (for example,
per action regret [23, 22]) compares an arbitrary policy with a policy of using the best ranked
action in the hindsight, i.e., with the greedy evasion policy. A distinctive feature of our setting
is that the evader’s actions determine the information collected by the interdictor and, thus,
influence the structure of the setting.
In view of the discussion above, the contribution of this paper (and its remaining structure)
can be summarized as follows:
• In Section 2, we formulate the repeated evasion model with multiple decision epochs
under the assumption that the interdictor follows a greedy interdiction policy. In the
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deterministic setting with perfect information feedback, this model can be viewed as a
particular class of hierarchical deterministic combinatorial optimization problems, which
is the main focus of this study.
• In Section 3, we explore the theoretical computational complexity of the considered
evader’s problem. We show that the evader’s problem is NP -hard in the case of two
decision epochs as long as there are no restrictions for the initial information available to
the interdictor. This result is established for networks where the interdiction problem is
polynomially solvable.
• In Section 4, we provide theoretical analysis of evasion policies in the setting with two
decision epochs, where the interdictor has no initial information about the network arcs.
We show that under some mild assumption, the optimal evasion decision is either greedy,
or consists of two distinct paths that intersect (i.e., have some arcs in common) with the
overall shortest path in the network.
• In Section 5, we exploit these theoretical properties to develop a heuristic algorithm for
the strategic evader in a more general setting with an arbitrary time horizon and no
restrictions on the initial information available to the interdictor.
• In Section 6, we perform computational experiments that demonstrate that the proposed
heuristic consistently outperforms the greedy evasion policy on several classes of synthetic
network instances. In our experiments, in addition to perfect information feedback we
also consider feedback scenarios, where the information obtained by the interdictor from
the evader’s actions is noisy.
Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper, highlights interesting insights from our theoretical re-
sults and computational observations, and then outlines promising directions for future research.
Notation. In the remainder of the paper we use the following notation. Let G = (N,A) be
a connected weighted directed graph, where N and A denote its sets of nodes and directed
arcs, respectively. Denote by ca a nonnegative arc cost associated with each arc a ∈ A. For
A′ ⊆ A we define a subgraph of G induced by this subset of arcs as G[A′] = (N,A′). Denote by
T ∈ Z>0 the number of decision epochs (or rounds) and by k ∈ Z>0 the interdictor’s budget.
Furthermore, we define two particular nodes in G, which are referred to as the source, s, and
destination, f , nodes, respectively. Let Psf(G) be a set of all simple directed paths from s to f
in network G. Any path P ∈ Psf(G) is given by a sequence of arcs (s, v1), (v1, v2), . . . , (v|P |−1, f),
which we denote by {s → v1 → . . . → v|P |−1 → f} for convenience. Also, let ℓ(P ) be the cost
of path P ∈ Psf(G), that is ℓ(P ) =
∑
a∈P ca. Finally, define
z(G) = min
P∈Psf (G)
ℓ(P ),
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i.e., z(G) is the cost of the shortest path from s to f in G.
2. Mathematical Model
We consider a sequential decision-making process, where in each decision epoch (round)
t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} an evader and an interdictor interact. The evader has full information about
the underlying network, while the interdictor has limited information about its structure and
costs. In particular, we assume that the interdictor initially observes a subnetwork G[A0] of
the given network G = (N,A), i.e., he is informed only about the existence of arcs in A0 along
with their costs {ca}a∈A0 . Let
C0 = (N,A0),
where we refer to C0 as the initial information available to the interdictor as it contains his
initial knowledge about the structure and costs of the network.
In each decision epoch t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} the following sequence of events takes place:
1. The interdictor chooses set It ⊆ At−1 of at most k arcs to be blocked for the time of
exactly one decision epoch.
2. The evader traverses along path Pt ∈ Psf (G[A \ It]). We refer to ℓ(Pt) as the evader’s
instantaneous loss. The evader also reveals the arcs in Pt and their costs to the interdictor.
3. The interdictor updates the information available to him, i.e., At = At−1 ∪ Pt.
We assume that the evader attempts to minimize her cumulative loss over T rounds, while
the interdictor is restricted to act greedily in each decision epoch. In addition, we make the
following assumptions:
A1. In each round the interdictor acts first. Furthermore, the interdictor is greedy in the
sense that he always blocks a set of k-most vital arcs in the observed network, i.e.,
It ∈ argmax{z(G[At−1 \ I]) : I ⊆ At−1, |I| ≤ k}. (1)
A2. Graph G is not trivially k-separable that is, any subset of k arcs in G is not an s-f cut.
A3. If there is more than one possible choice for It, then the interdictor blocks arcs follow-
ing a well-defined deterministic rule, which is consistent in the sense that if It is chosen from a
collection of blocking solutions I, then it is also chosen from any collection of solutions I˜ ⊆ I
containing It.
A4. The evader has full information about the graph’s structure, costs and the interdictor’s
budget, k. The evader observes the interdictor’s actions before choosing a path and cannot use
interdicted arcs.
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A5. The interdictor is initially given information only about subnetwork G[A0]. Each round
he observes path Pt and cost ca of each arc a ∈ Pt used by the evader.
The first part of Assumption A1 is technical. The second part of A1 can be motivated by
the interdictor’s incomplete initial information about the network’s structure and costs, which
is reasonable from the application perspective. More importantly, as we discuss explicitly in
Section 1, the studies in [6, 7] establish a number of attractive and practically relevant features
of greedy interdiction policies both in the shortest path interdiction and general max-min linear
mixed-integer programming settings.
Assumption A2 is technical as it ensures that the evader’s problem is feasible at each round.
Assumption A3 implies that the interdictor’s policies are deterministic. The consistency as-
sumption mimics an analogous assumption in [6] for the evader’s policies. For example, one
can think that in each decision epoch the interdictor ranks all feasible blocking solutions in the
observed network based on some criteria, e.g., their costs to the evader, resolving ties according
to any deterministic criteria. Then the interdictor selects the highest-rank blocking solution
from such a list.
Assumption A4 implies that the evader has some degree of monitoring of the interdictor’s
actions. The second part of this assumption is a standard conjecture in the interdiction, bilevel,
and general hierarchical optimization literature; see, e.g., [35, 36, 39, 33].
The first part of Assumption A5 formalizes the notion of some initial knowledge of the
interdictor about the underlying network. The second part of Assumption A5 represents the
case of the perfect (or transparent) feedback (from the evader to the interdictor) similar to [6, 7]
that are the basis for this study (recall our discussion in Section 1). We exploit this assumption
in derivations of our theoretical results. However, we relax this assumption in our computational
study in Section 6. Finally, recall that the interdictor has full information about the costs of
arcs in A0. Thus, A5 implies that whenever existence of the arc is known to the interdictor at
any decision epoch, then he is also aware of its cost.
In view of the discussion above, the evader’s problem can be formulated as the following
repeated hierarchical combinatorial optimization problem:
min
Pt
T∑
t=1
ℓ(Pt) :=
T∑
t=1
∑
a∈Pt
ca (2a)
s.t. Pt ∈ Psf (G[A \ It]) ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, (2b)
It ∈ argmax{z(G[At−1 \ I]) : I ⊆ At−1, |I| ≤ k} ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, (2c)
At = At−1 ∪ Pt ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, (2d)
where the evader’s objective function in (2a) represents the sum of the evader’s instantaneous
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losses of T decision epochs. Condition (2b) ensures that Pt does not include arcs, which are
blocked by the interdictor at round t. Constraint (2c) requires It to be a set of k-most vital
arcs in G[At−1] (recall assumption A1), i.e., an optimal solution of the interdiction problem in
each decision epoch, and thus, leads to the hierarchical decision-making structure of the overall
sequential problem. Then (2d) states that a set of arcs known to the interdictor at round t is
updated according to assumption A5.
From the game theoretic perspective, the evader’s problem (2) can be viewed as a finitely re-
peated Stackelberg game with incomplete information; see, e.g., [34] and the references therein.
Specifically, in each decision epoch t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} the evasion-blocking pair (Pt, It+1) forms
a Stackelberg equilibria in the currently observed network G[At]. Next, we provide formal
definitions of evasion and interdiction policies along with some examples.
Definition 1. An evasion policy is a deterministic sequence of set functions (πt)|t∈{1,...,T} such
that for each t ≥ 1, P pit = πt(F
pi
t ), P
pi
t ∈ Psf(G[A \ It]), where F
pi
t summarizes the initial
information as well as the history of the interdiction and evasion decisions up to round t:
F pit = (C0, I1, P
pi
1 , . . . , It−1, P
pi
t−1, It). 
Note that in Definition 1 an evasion policy in round t accounts for the sequence of previous
blocking and evasion decisions. This assumption is necessary since the evader attempts to
minimize her cumulative loss over T rounds and thus, forms an overall sequence of evasion
decisions P pit , t ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
Definition 2. The evader and her policy are referred to as greedy if she chooses the shortest
path in the interdicted network in each round. The evader and her policy are called strategic if
she solves (heuristically or exactly) sequential hierarchical optimization problem (2). 
Simply speaking, the greedy evader corresponds to a decision-maker who is myopic and opti-
mizes only her instantaneous loss in each decision epoch. Alternatively, the upper-level decision-
maker in (2) can be viewed as a team of evaders, one for each decision epoch. Then the greedy
policy corresponds to a scenario where the team is decentralized and each evader optimizes her
own objective function, while the objective function in (2a) represents the total team’s loss.
We denote by P SPt and P
SE
t , t ≥ 1, the evasion decisions by the greedy and strategic evaders,
respectively. Given G and C0, define the cumulative loss of the evader under evasion policy π
over T rounds as follows:
LpiT (G, C0) :=
T∑
t=1
ℓ(P pit )
Let Π(G, C0) be a class of all feasible evasion policies for G and C0. Thus, for some fixed values
of k and T we say that evasion policy π ∈ Π(G, C0) strongly dominates policy π
′ ∈ Π(G, C0) if
LpiT (G, C0) < L
pi′
T (G, C0).
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Definition 3. The interdictor is referred to as a greedy semi-oracle, if for any t ∈ {1, . . . , T}
the following conditions hold:
(i) The interdictor has complete knowledge of the evader’s policy π.
(ii) If the k-most vital arcs problem in G[At−1], i.e., problem (2c), has multiple optimal so-
lutions, then the interdictor selects the one that is least favorable for the evader under
policy π in the current decision epoch t.
(iii) Furthermore, among these solutions the one with maximum cardinality is preferred. 
In other words, the greedy semi-oracle chooses a set of the k-most vital arcs It ⊆ At−1 in
G[At−1] so as to maximize the evader’s instantaneous loss ℓ(P
pi
t ). We also provide a technical
requirement that the interdictor maximizes |It| as his auxiliary objective; see, e.g., Example 1.
Simply speaking we assume that a greedy semi-oracle has full information about the net-
work’s structure and costs, but is restricted to act greedily by blocking a set of the k-most vital
arcs in the currently observed network G[At−1]. However, given his knowledge of G he can an-
ticipate the evader’s actions in the current round and thus, select solutions that are preferable
for him and least favorable to the evader.
For example, assume that the policy π in Definition 3 is a greedy evasion policy and T = 1.
Then our definition of the greedy semi-oracle can be viewed as a pessimistic version of the
evader’s problem (2). More precisely, if the lower-level decision-maker (the interdictor) has
multiple optimal solutions, then he prefers the one that is least favorable to the upper-level
decision-maker (the evader); see [11] for further details on bilevel optimization.
Next, we provide two illustrative examples comparing the greedy evader against a strategic
one. These examples provide us with further motivation of exploring the structural properties of
strategic evasion policies discussed in Section 4. In the examples we assume that the interdictor
is a greedy semi-oracle.
Example 1. Graph G used in this example, is provided in Figure 1. Let s = 1 and f = 4 be the
evader’s source and destination nodes, respectively, and M be a real number such that M > 5.
We also set T = 2, k = 2 and A0 = ∅.
First, assume that the evader is greedy. Since A0 = ∅ we have I1 = ∅ and in the first round
the greedy evader follows the overall shortest path given by P SP1 = {1 → 2 → 3 → 4}. Note
that A1 = P
SP
1 and thus, any subset of arcs of P
SP
1 is also an optimal solution of the k-most
vital arcs problem in G[A1].
Next, recall that the interdictor is a greedy semi-oracle; see Definition 3. Hence, he knows
that the evasion policy π is greedy and attempts to maximize the evader’s instantaneous loss
ℓ(P pi2 ) = z(G[A\ I2]) in the second decision epoch. We conclude that the interdictor blocks arcs
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Figure 1: The network used in Examples 1 and 2. For the costs of arcs (1, 4) and (1, 5) we assume that M > 5.
(1, 2) and (3, 4), which implies that I2 = {(1, 2), (3, 4)} and P
SP
2 = {1→ 5→ 4}. Observe that
|I2| = 2 = k and, therefore, the blocking solution with maximal possible cardinality is selected.
As a result, the cumulative loss of the greedy evader is given by LSP2 = 3 +M .
Then consider a strategic evader, who sequentially traverses through arc-disjoint paths
P SE1 = {1 → 2 → 4} and P
SE
2 = {1 → 3 → 4}. In this case I2 = {(1, 2), (2, 4)} and the
cumulative loss of the strategic evader is given by LSE2 = 4 + 4 = 8 < L
SP
2 . 
Example 1 illustrates that if the evader is aware that the interdictor is greedy, then she can
exploit this fact to decrease her cumulative loss. Furthermore, observe that the paths used by
the strategic evader have some arcs in common with the shortest path. In Section 4 we formally
establish that this observation is, in fact, a necessary condition for the strategic evasion policy
whenever it outperforms the greedy one under the assumption that T = 2, k ≥ 1 and A0 = ∅.
In Example 2 provided below we demonstrate that the greedy evasion policy can be dom-
inated by a strategic policy for arbitrarily large T ≥ 2, while A0 does not necessarily need to
be empty.
Example 2. As in the previous example consider the graph depicted in Figure 1. In contrast to
Example 1, we change A0 in a particular way and assume that T is arbitrarily large, i.e., T ≥ 2.
More precisely, let A0 be non-empty and given by A0 = {(1, 3), (2, 4), (1, 4), (1, 5), (5, 4)}.
First, we have I1 = {(1, 4), (1, 5)} regardless of the evasion policy as the interdictor acts first.
Then the greedy evader traverses along path P SP1 = {1→ 2→ 3→ 4}. Next, at t = 2 the inter-
dictor blocks I2 = {(1, 2), (3, 4)}, which is a set of the k-most vital arcs in G[A1] and the evader
follows P SP2 = {1 → 5 → 4}. Furthermore, observe that P
SP
t = P
SP
2 , It = I2 for all t ≥ 3.
Hence, the cumulative loss of the greedy evader is given by LSPT = 3+M(T − 1) for any T ≥ 2.
For a strategic evader, assume that she traverses through P SE1 = {1 → 3 → 4} at t = 1.
Then I2 = {(1, 4), (3, 4)} and P
SE
2 = {1 → 2 → 4}. Consequently, It = {(1, 2), (3, 4)} and
P SEt = P
SP
2 for all t ≥ 3. It implies that the cumulative loss of the strategic evader is
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LSET = 8 +M(T − 2). Therefore, for arbitrary T ≥ 2 we have:
LSPT − L
SE
T =M − 5 > 0,
and thus, the greedy evasion policy is suboptimal for arbitrarily large values of parameter T . 
3. Computational Complexity
Observe that the evader’s problem in the case of T = 1 can be solved efficiently whenever
the k-most vital arcs problem in G[A0] admits a polynomial time algorithm. Alternatively, the
evader may have access to an interdiction oracle that provides optimal blocking decisions in the
network currently observed by the interdictor. If such interdiction oracle exists, then for A0 6= ∅
and T = 1 the evader’s problem coincides with the shortest path problem in the interdicted
network G[A \ I1], which is known to be polynomially solvable [2].
However, in general the k-most vital arcs problem is known to be NP -hard [20] and thus,
checking feasibility of an evasion solution is NP -hard. A more challenging problem is to deter-
mine whether the evader’s problem is computationally difficult, when the interdiction problem
is “easy” to solve. In this section we show that the evader’s problem is NP -hard in the case of
T = 2 even for network instances where the interdiction problem can be solved in polynomial
time. Henceforth, we assume that the interdictor is a greedy semi-oracle.
In our complexity reduction below we assume that arc set A consists of two disjoint subsets,
namely, the arcs that are either removable or unremovable by the interdictor, respectively. The
notion of unremovable arcs is technical and made without loss of generality as we can make all
arcs removable by a polynomial time modification of the original graph. Specifically, we can
simply replace each unremovable arc (i, j) by k+1 parallel arcs of equal costs. This construction
guarantees that after the removal of at most k arcs, at least one of these arcs remains intact
and thus, nodes i and j remain connected by a directed arc. Alternatively (e.g., if parallel arcs
are not allowed), we can replace each unremovable arc by k + 1 paths of length two by adding
k + 1 and 2(k + 1) of new nodes and arcs, respectively, which results in the same outcome.
Next, we define the classical 3-SAT problem, which is known to be NP -complete [16]:
Problem 3-SAT.
Instance: collection F = {F1, . . . , Fm} of clauses on a finite set of variables U , |U | = n, such
that |Fi| = 3 for i ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
Question: is there a truth assignment τ for U that satisfies all the clauses in F ? 
Boolean formula F = F1 ∧ F2 ∧ . . . ∧ Fm is satisfied under assignment τ if and only if each
clause is true. Clause Fj is true if and only if it contains either literal xij such that τ(xij ) = true
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Figure 2: Construction of the i-th lobe corresponding to variable xi, where pi is the number of occurrences of
variable xi in the clauses. Yellow dashed arcs are unremovable, and each of them has costM that is a sufficiently
large constant parameter. The cost of removable arcs is either 0 or 1 as depicted for each arc.
or literal xij such that τ(xij ) = false.
We also define the decision version of the evader’s problem (EP) for T = 2:
Problem 2-EP.
Instance: network G together with source and destination nodes, subset of arcs A0 known to
the interdictor, the interdiction budget k ∈ Z>0 and threshold h ∈ R>0.
Question: is there two paths P1, P2 ∈ Psf(G) of total cost at most h that can be traversed
sequentially by the evader given that the interdictor is a greedy semi-oracle? 
The proof of our main result below is based on the reduction from the 3-SAT problem,
where for any instance of 3-SAT we construct a particular instance of the 2-EP problem.
Following the discussion above we construct the instance of 2-EP such that feasibility of any
evasion solution can be checked in polynomial time with respect to the number of arcs, i.e., the
k-most vital arcs problem in both G[A0] and G[A1] is polynomially solvable. Our construction
is inspired and similar to the one used in [25], where it is shown that the problem of finding
two minimum-cost arc-disjoint paths with non-uniform costs (e.g., changing over time or type
of flow) is strongly NP -complete. However, our problem setting requires a somewhat different
arc cost structure and the use of unremovable arcs defined at the beginning of this section.
Specifically, given boolean formula F = F1∧F2∧. . .∧Fm, let pi be the number of occurrences
of variable xi in F . For each variable xi we construct a lobe as illustrated in Figure 2.
The lobes are connected to one another in series with w1 = s and wn+1 = f . Recall
that s and f are source and destination nodes, respectively. For each clause Fj , we add two
nodes yj , zj , j ∈ {1, . . . , m} together with arcs (s, y1), (zj , yj+1), j ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1} and
(zm, f) of cost 0. Finally, to connect clauses to variables we add the following arcs with zero
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Figure 3: The graph corresponding to a 3-SAT instance with F = (x1∨x2∨x3)∧ (x1∨x2∨x3)∧ (x1∨x2∨x3).
Here n = 3 is the number of lobes (or variables), m = 3 is the number of clauses, unremovable arcs and the
arc costs within the lobes are not depicted (we refer to Figure 2 for the detailed depiction of the lobes). Nodes
w1 = s and w4 = f are the source and destination nodes of the constructed graph, respectively. Suppose
τ(xi) = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 3}. Green and blue arcs form paths P1 and P2, respectively, i.e., the solution of the
evader’s problem with T = 2, A0 = {(s, y1), (zm, f), (zj, yj+1), j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}} ∪B0, where B0 is the set of
unremovable arcs, h = 3m+ n, k is such that 3m ≤ k ≤ 6m+ n and M ≥ 2.
costs: (yj, u
i
q) and (v
i
q, zj), if the q-th occurrence of variable xi is the literal xi, which is a
literal in clause Fj ; (yj, u
i
q) and (v
i
q, zj), if the q-th occurrence of variable xi is the literal xi,
which is a literal in clause Fj . We refer to Figure 3 that illustrates the constructed graph for
F = (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3) ∧ (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3) ∧ (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3).
Theorem 1. Problem 2-EP is strongly NP -complete for the class of network instances where
the interdiction problem (in G[A0] and G[A1]) is polynomially solvable.
Proof. ⇒ Consider a “yes”-instance of 3-SAT. Thus, there exists assignment τ such that
boolean formula F = F1∧F2∧. . .∧Fm is satisfied under τ . Assume that we construct a graph for
this instance as outlined in the discussion above. Next, let A0 = {(s, y1), (zm, f), (zj, yj+1), j ∈
{1, . . . , m− 1}} ∪ B0, where B0 is the set of unremovable arcs, h = 3m+ n and k is such that
3m ≤ k ≤ 6m+ n, where M ≥ 2.
Observe that I1 = A0 \ B0, since the interdictor is a greedy semi-oracle. Actually, k is
sufficiently large to block all arcs in I1 and interdiction of I1 maximizes the cost of the shortest
path in G[A0 \ I1], i.e., I1 ∈ argmax{z(G[A0 \ I]) : |I| ≤ k, I ⊆ A0}.
At t = 1 let the evader choose path P1 that is constructed in the following way. It traverses
through the lower part of the i-th lobe, if τ(xi) = true, and it traverses through the upper part,
if τ(xi) = false. Observe that ℓ(P1) = 3m + n. The information collected by the interdictor
is updated and thus, A1 = A0 ∪ P1. Note that set of arcs A1 consists of path P1 together with
parallel unremovable arcs and set A0 \B0 that contains m+ 1 distinct arcs that do not form a
path from s to f . Furthermore, any evasion decision at t = 1 does not include arcs in A0 and
goes through all the lobes. We conclude that the interdiction problem in both G[A0] and G[A1]
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is polynomially solvable.
The presence of unremovable arcs of sufficiently large costs that are parallel to arcs in P1
enforces the interdictor to remove arcs in the order of their costs. That is he blocks arcs of
zero cost first and then blocks arcs of unit cost. Recall that k ≥ 3m. Therefore, the blocking
decision at t = 2 consists of at least 3m arcs of P1 including all arcs with zero cost. We conclude
that I2 ⊆ P1 and I2 ∩ I1 = ∅ due to the fact k ≤ |P1| = 6m+ n.
Then there exist at least m un-blocked subpaths {yj → u
i
k → v
i
k → zj} or {yj → u
i
k → v
i
k →
zj} that correspond to the variable assignments in τ . Together with arcs (s, y1) and (zm, f)
they form path P2 that is arc-disjoint with P1 by their construction and can be traversed by
the evader at t = 2. The cumulative loss of the evader equals h = 3m+ n. Hence, the answer
to the evader’s problem is “yes.”
⇐ Consider a “yes”-instance of the evader’s problem withA0 = {(s, y1), (zm, f), (zj, yj+1), j ∈
{1, . . . , m− 1}} ∪B0, h = 3m+ n and k is such that 3m ≤ k ≤ 6m+ n. Then there exist two
paths that can be traversed sequentially by the evader and their total cost is at most h.
Observe that the choice of I1 does not depend on the evader’s actions. Path P1 goes through
either the upper or the lower part of each lobe. Therefore, path P1 in the evader’s decision has
cost h = 3m+ n, while P2 has zero cost. Furthermore, the fact that k ≥ 3m implies that P2 is
arc-disjoint with P1.
Next, we note that as the cost of P2 is zero, then it needs to contain arcs (s, y1) and (zm, f).
Furthermore, P2 needs to traverse through arcs (zj , yj+1), j ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1}} and each lobe
through the zero cost arcs. We construct assignment τ in the following way: if P1 traverses
through the lower part of the i-th lobe, let τ(xi) = true and, if it traverses through the upper
part, then let τ(xi) = false. According to this assignment due to the existence of P2 each
clause Fj, j ∈ {1, . . . , m− 1}}, is satisfied, which implies the necessary result.
We conclude that the evader’s problem is computationally hard even when T = 2 and the
network instances admit a polynomial-time solution of the k-most vital arcs problem. The
strong NP -completeness of 2-EP also implies that there is no fully polynomial-time approxi-
mation scheme (or FPTAS) for the evader’s problem unless P = NP [16]. For future work it
can be of interest to explore whether constant factor approximation algorithms exist for 2-EP
and how the complexity of the problem changes if k is bounded by a constant.
In view of the above in the remainder of the paper we explore analytical properties of the
optimal evasion policies in a simple case, i.e., T = 2 and A0 = ∅, and then exploit them to
propose a heuristic algorithm for an arbitrary set of initial information and any time horizon
that outperforms a greedy approach.
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4. Basic Analysis of Evasion Policies
In this section we provide basic analysis of evasion policies for the case of two decision epochs
when no initial information is available to the interdictor, i.e., T = 2 and A0 = ∅. Specifically,
under some rather mild assumption we show that an optimal solution of the evader’s problem is
either greedy or consists of two distinct paths that intersect with the shortest path in the non-
interdicted network. The latter observation gives us a basis for developing a heuristic approach
of finding strategic evasion decisions; see Section 5. Then we demonstrate that for k = 1 the
greedy evasion policy is optimal. Finally, it can be rather easily shown that for sufficiently large
values of k an optimal evasion solution consists of two arc-disjoint paths.
In the remainder of this section to simplify our derivations we assume that the costs of all
possible paths from s to f are distinct. Thus, we can enumerate them in the strictly increasing
order of their costs, i.e.,
ℓ(P (1)) < ℓ(P (2)) < . . . < ℓ(P (µ)), (3)
where |Psf(G)| = µ. Denote by ν(P ) the index of path P ∈ Psf(G) in the above ordering.
Lemma 1. Let A0 = ∅, k ≥ 1 and assume that the evader is greedy. Denote by r the index of
path traversed by the evader at t = 2, i.e., r = ν(P SP2 ). Then for any z ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r− 1} path
P (z) is blocked by the interdictor at t = 2.
Proof. The results follows from the definition of the greedy evader. Since A0 = ∅ and k ≥ 1,
we have r > 1.
Next, we provide some basic necessary conditions for an evasion solution to be optimal when
T = 2 and A0 = ∅.
Theorem 2. Assume that the interdictor is a greedy semi-oracle with A0 = ∅ and k ≥ 1. Let
T = 2 and r = ν(P SP2 ), where r ≥ 2. If P
OPT
1 = P
(i) and POPT2 = P
(j) is an optimal solution
of the evader’s problem for T = 2, then either i = 1 and j = r, or P (i) and P (j) satisfy the
following conditions:
P (i) ∩ P (1) 6= ∅ and P (j) ∩ P (1) 6= ∅, (4)
ℓ(P (1)) + ℓ(P (r)) > ℓ(P (i)) + ℓ(P (j)), (5)
1 < i < r, 1 < j < r and i 6= j. (6)
Proof. First, suppose that the greedy evasion policy is optimal. By the definition of r we have
that the greedy evader traverses through P (1) and P (r) sequentially. Hence, i = 1 and j = r.
Conversely, assume that the optimal evasion policy is not greedy, which implies that condi-
tion (5) holds. Thus, we need to show that conditions (4) and (6) are satisfied.
If condition (6) does not hold, then we consider the following possible scenarios:
16
(i) We have that either i ≥ r, or j ≥ r. If i ≥ r, then by assumption (3) the following
inequalities hold:
ℓ(P (1)) ≤ ℓ(P (j)), ℓ(P (r)) ≤ ℓ(P (i)),
which implies that (5) is violated and results in a contradiction. The case j ≥ r is similar;
(ii) We have that i = 1. Clearly in this case the greedy evasion solution is optimal and (5) is
not satisfied (recall that the greedy evader traverses through P (1) at t = 1);
(iii) We have that j = 1. In other words, path P (1) is not blocked by the interdictor at t = 2.
Since the interdictor is a greedy semi-oracle and the evader traverses through P (i) and P (1)
sequentially we conclude that P (i) and P (1) are arc-disjoint, i.e., P (i) ∩ P (1) = ∅. Thus,
conversely, if the evader is greedy, then path P (i) cannot be blocked by the interdictor at
t = 2 as A0 = ∅. From Lemma 1 we observe that i ≥ r and thus, we can simply refer to
the discussion above in (i).
We conclude that condition (6) is satisfied.
Finally, assume that (4) is violated and thus, either P (i) or P (j) is arc-disjoint with P (1).
Hence, if the evader is greedy and A0 = ∅, then either P
(i) or P (j), respectively, cannot be
blocked at t = 2. Therefore, we have that either i ≥ r or j ≥ r (recall again Lemma 1), which
contradicts (6) and hence, completes the proof.
This result implies that there exist two mutually exclusive alternatives: either the greedy
evasion policy is optimal or there exists another evasion solution (better than the greedy one),
which consists of two distinct paths that both have some arcs in common with the shortest
path from s to f in the non-interdicted graph, see (4).
Clearly, one natural question arising next is whether these two distinct paths of the latter
alternative are either arc-disjoint or intersect by themselves as well. In particular, from Exam-
ple 1 in Section 2 one may hypothesize that an optimal evasion solution for T = 2 and A0 = ∅ is
either greedy, or consists of two arc-disjoint paths of minimal total costs. While it is often the
case in many simple problem instances, nevertheless this hypothesis does not hold in general.
Specifically, next we construct an instance of the evader’s problem, where an optimal evasion
solution consists of two distinct paths that intersect along some arcs that are also contained in
the shortest path from s to f . The latter fact illustrates that the necessary conditions given by
(4)-(6) in Theorem 2 hold.
Example 3. Consider the network depicted in Figure 4. Let s = 1 and f = 11. Assume also
that T = 2, k = 3 and A0 = ∅. Observe that in the first decision epoch the greedy evader
follows the shortest path P SP1 = {1→ 2→ . . .→ 11} of cost zero, while the interdictor blocks
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Figure 4: The network used in Example 3. The arc costs are depicted inside each arc.
set of arcs I1 = {(1, 2), (4, 5), (10, 11)}. Hence, in the second round the evader must traverse
through path P SP2 = {1→ 12→ 11} with her total loss of L
SP
2 = 0+ 11 = 11 over two rounds.
Next, it can be verified that the cost of any arc-disjoint evasion solution from s to f is
at least 11. Nevertheless, consider a strategic evader who first traverses through path P SE1 =
{1→ 3→ 4→ . . .→ 11}. Then the interdictor’s solution is I1 = {(4, 5), (6, 7), (8, 9)} to block
all paths of cost 8. Then the strategic evader follows path P SE2 = {1 → 10 → 11} and her
cumulative loss over two rounds is given by LSE2 = 1 + 9 = 10 < L
SP
2 . Thus, in this example
neither greedy nor arc-disjoint evasion solutions are optimal. 
However, both greedy and arc-disjoint evasion solutions can be shown to be optimal for
specific values of parameter k. First, it can be shown that the greedy evasion policy is optimal
when k = 1, i.e., the interdictor blocks one arc in each decision epoch.
Proposition 1. Assume that the interdictor is a greedy semi-oracle with A0 = ∅. Let T = 2
and k = 1. Then the greedy evasion solution is optimal.
Proof. Recall from Lemma 1 that if the evader is greedy and A0 = ∅, then for any z ∈
{1, 2, . . . , r− 1} path P (z) is blocked at t = 2 by the interdictor. Since the interdictor’s budget
k = 1 we conclude that all paths P (z), z ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r − 1}, have an arc in common, i.e., there
exist e ∈ A such that e ∈ P (z) for all z ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r − 1}.
Assume that the greedy evasion decision is not optimal. Then the optimal solution, namely,
paths P (i) and P (j) must satisfy conditions (4) - (6) of Theorem 2. In particular, we have
that 1 < i, j < r and thus, these two paths have arc e in common that is, e ∈ P (i) ∩ P (j).
Following the discussion above arc e also belongs to the shortest path P (1). Observe that with
A1 = P
(i) the greedy semi-oracle interdictor must block e and, thus, P (j) cannot be traversed
by the strategic evader at t = 2. It contradicts with our earlier assumption that P (i) and P (j)
form an optimal evasion solution.
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Figure 5: The network used in Example 4. The arc costs are depicted inside each arc, where M > 0.
Remark 1. Moreover, if k is sufficiently large, then for T = 2 it is rather easy to observe
that if the interdictor is a greedy semi-oracle with A0 = ∅, then an optimal evasion solution
consists of two arc-disjoint paths. Specifically, since A0 is empty, then in the first decision
epoch there are no interdicted arcs. Consider an evasion path in the first decision epoch of any
optimal evasion solution. If the value of k is larger than or equal to the number of arcs in this
path, then by the definition of a greedy semi-oracle all arcs in this path are interdicted in the
second decision epoch. Thus, the evader’s consequent evasion path cannot contain arcs from
her previous evasion path. 
Next, recall that in Example 1 the loss of the greedy evader is equal to 3 +M , while the
optimal evasion solution has cost 8. Hence, for any constant β ∈ R>0 and sufficiently large
values of parameter M we have:
βLSE2 < L
SP
2 ,
which implies that in general the greedy evasion solution cannot approximate an optimal evasion
solution with any constant factor. The next example demonstrates that the latter property also
holds for any arc-disjoint evasion solution.
Example 4. Consider the network depicted in Figure 5. Assume that T = 2, A0 = ∅ and
k = 2. The greedy evader follows the shortest path of cost zero in the first decision epoch, i.e.,
P SP1 = {1 → 2 → . . . → |V |}. The interdictor blocks any k = 2 arcs of P
SP
1 and thus, the
evader must use two arcs of cost M in the second round. Observe that LSP2 = 0 + 2M = 2M .
On the other hand, any arc-disjoint solution contains all arcs of cost M and thus, its cost is
equal toM |A|
2
. We conclude that the approximation factor of any arc-disjoint solution is O(|A|)
and therefore, not bounded by a constant. 
To summarize the discussion of this section, we conclude that in general both greedy and
arc-disjoint evasion solutions can be suboptimal. Moreover, an optimal evasion solution may
be somewhat non-trivial even for T = 2 and A0 = ∅ as long as k is at least two (recall Propo-
sition 1 for k = 1), but also not too large (Remark 1). However, the necessary conditions given
by Theorem 2 provide us an intuition that we can exploit in the design of a heuristic algorithm
for the strategic evader, which we discuss next.
5. Heuristic Algorithm for the Strategic Evader
In this section we propose a heuristic algorithm for the strategic evader. The key idea of
the algorithm is motivated by theoretical observations provided in the previous section, namely,
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Theorem 2, and is based on the two-step “look-ahead” concept. However, in contrast to Sec-
tion 4 we do not assume that A0 = ∅.
Algorithm 1: Heuristic Algorithm for the Strategic Evader
1 Input: Directed graph G = (N,A,C), the source and destination nodes for the evader,
the maximum number of arcs that can be blocked by the interdictor k, index of the
current time epoch τ , set of arcs Aτ−1 that are known to the interdictor, heuristic
parameters α ∈ (0, 1] and q ∈ Z>0
2 Output: Evasion decisions for the next one or two time epochs
3 t←− τ, Iτ ←− argmax{z(G[Aτ \ I]) : |I| ≤ k}
4 PSPτ ←− the shortest path in G[A \ Iτ ]
5 A
′
τ ←− Aτ−1 ∪ P
SP
τ
6 I
′
τ+1 ←− argmax{z(G[A
′
τ \ I] : |I| ≤ k}
7 PSPτ+1 ←− the shortest path in G[A \ I
′
τ+1]
8 CurrentBestDecision←− {PSPτ } current (greedy) evasion decision
9 CurrentBestSolution←− ℓ(PSPτ ) + ℓ(P
SP
τ+1)
10 δτ ←− α ·
(
ℓ(PSPτ ) + ℓ(P
SP
τ+1)
)
a threshold that depends on the heuristic parameter α
11 for (b(1), . . . , b(q)) ∈ PSPτ do
12 begin
13 P SEτ ←− the shortest path in G[A \ (Iτ ∪ (
⋃q
i=1 b
(i))]
14 if ℓ(P SEτ ) < δτ and P
SE
τ ∩ P
SP
τ 6= ∅ then
15 begin
16 A
′′
τ ←− Aτ−1 ∪ P
SE
τ
17 I
′′
τ+1 ←− argmax{z(G[A
′′
τ \ I] : |I| ≤ k}
18 P SEτ+1 ←− the shortest path in G[A \ I
′′
τ+1]
19 if ℓ(P SEτ ) + ℓ(P
SE
τ+1) < CurrentBestSolution then
20 begin
21 CurrentBestDecision←− {P SEτ , P
SE
τ+1}
22 CurrentBestSolution←− ℓ(P SEτ ) + ℓ(P
SE
τ+1)
23 end
24 end
25 end
26 return CurrentBestDecision
In the algorithm in each decision epoch the evader has two options: either she follows the
greedy policy, or seeks for two alternative paths that can be traversed sequentially with the
cumulative cost less than the loss obtained by the greedy approach. The pair of alternative
paths is generated in a heuristic manner (see the details further in this section) by blocking
a subset of arcs of some predefined cardinality of the shortest path in the network and then
verifying that conditions (4)-(5) of Theorem 2 hold. It is important to note that because of
its two-step look-ahead scheme our algorithm can be applied in an iterative manner for any
arbitrary time horizon T .
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We assume that the heuristic has access to an interdiction oracle that returns a set of k-
most vital arcs in the network, currently observed by the interdictor. In general, the k-most
vital arcs problem is known to be NP -hard [32]. However, it can be rather effectively solved
by decomposition algorithms; see, e.g., [20], that are typically faster than a naive branch-and-
bound approach. Moreover, taking into account the structure of the problem, the decomposition
algorithms can often be speeded up, if we store previous evasion decisions. Next, we discuss
the key features of our algorithm in details and describe its links to Theorem 2. We refer to
Algorithm 1 for the pseudocode.
At the beginning of the τ -th epoch the evader observes the information collected by the
interdictor up to time t = τ , i.e., set Aτ−1 and the corresponding blocking decision Iτ . First, in
lines 6− 9 of Algorithm 1 we compute the evader’s loss if she follows the greedy policy. (Note
that we use PSPτ and P
SP
τ+1 to denote these paths as they do not necessarily coincide with P
SP
τ
and P SPτ+1 due to the iterative nature of the heuristic.)
Then in lines 13−24 we seek for a pair of alternative paths that can provide a better decision
for the evader, e.g., if T = 2 and A0 = ∅, then our construction ensures that these paths satisfy
conditions (4)-(5) of Theorem 2. However, recall that Theorem 2 holds for A0 = ∅ and does
not take into consideration problems with A0 6= ∅. The latter is a more challenging case as the
properties of alternative paths depend on the set of initial information; see, e.g., Example 2.
Therefore, we resort to generating these paths in a heuristic manner as detailed below.
Specifically, to construct the first alternative path we first block q ∈ Z>0 arcs of P
SP
τ together
with set Iτ and identify the shortest path in the interdicted network, which is assumed to be
the first alternative path; see line 13 of Algorithm 1. As we block q arcs of the shortest path,
PSPτ , the newly constructed path, referred to as P
SE
τ , does not coincide with P
SP
τ .
In line 14 we verify, first, whether PSEτ contains some arcs in common with P
SP
τ and, further-
more, whether its loss is sufficiently small. The former requirement is motivated by condition (4)
of Theorem 2, while the latter requirement is controlled via the heuristic parameter α and is
linked to the evader’s loss under the greedy policy; see line 14 of Algorithm 1 and our additional
comments below. If both of these requirements are satisfied, then in line 18 we generate the
second alternative path, PSEτ+1, in a greedy manner by assuming that P
SE
τ is traversed at t = τ .
In line 19 we check whether the constructed solution is better than the best available solution,
which coincides with a greedy one at the first iteration; see lines 8 and 9. Then we repeat the
overall procedure in an iterative manner by blocking another subset of q arcs of PSPτ .
As briefly outlined in the discussion above the developed heuristic has two tunable param-
eters: α and q. The first one, α ∈ (0, 1], is used to compute δτ , which can be viewed as some
measure of difference between the instantaneous losses of the greedy evasion paths in epochs τ
and τ +1 and a potential evasion path for the strategic evader in epoch τ . Note that if α = 0.5,
then δτ is simply the average instantaneous loss of the greedy evader over two decision epochs.
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In particular, for smaller values of parameter α the algorithm takes into consideration for the
strategic evader only very promising evasion paths in epoch τ , see the first condition in line 14.
On the other hand, for larger values of α the algorithm considers a larger subset of candidate
evasion paths that are also required to intersect with the shortest path in the interdicted
network, see the second condition in line 14 and recall (4). Thus, by increasing the value of α
we increase the running time of the heuristic, but potentially improve the quality of the obtained
myopic solution for the two-steps look-ahead approach. Also, note that improvements over two
decision epochs do not necessarily imply improvements over longer decision-making horizons.
Furthermore, we use parameter q to characterize the number of arcs of PSPτ that are blocked
in addition to Iτ in order to ensure that the first of the newly constructed alternative paths does
not coincide with PSPτ . The choice of q is related with the following trade-off. Consider the
case of T = 2 and A0 = ∅. Note that Theorem 2, see (4), implies that the alternative evasion
paths have some arcs in common with the shortest path (i.e., the initial evasion path of the
greedy evader when A0 = ∅). Intuitively, by increasing the value of q we attempt to minimize
the cardinality of these subsets of arcs in common (and thus, generate a path that is sufficiently
different from the greedy evasion path in epoch τ), see line 13. On the other hand, the loss of
the first alternative path is required to be less than threshold δτ (see line 14 of Algorithm 1),
which, in turn, requires a sufficiently small value of q.
In summary, we observe that our heuristic approach finds optimal solutions for all the
considered examples, namely, Examples 1, 2 and 4, under a suitable choice of the heuristic
parameters, see additional discussion on the parameter settings in Section 6.1. Furthermore, if
q is bounded by a constant, then Algorithm 1 requires a polynomial in |A| number of calls to
the interdiction oracle.
6. Computational Study
In this section we compare the heuristic for the strategic evader (Algorithm 1) against the
greedy policy. We show that the heuristic approach performs sufficiently well even for rather
large values of T (recall that Algorithm 1 is myopic as it generates evasion decision only for
at most two time epochs) and consistently outperforms the greedy policy on several classes of
synthetic network instances. In addition to the perfect feedback scenario, we also consider a
noisy feedback scenario where for each arc initially unknown to the interdictor but traversed
by the evader at decision epoch t, i.e., a ∈ Pt \At−1, the interdictor does not obtain the perfect
information about the actual arc cost but rather observes a noisy realization of its nominal
cost. In other words, we relax Assumption A5 to reflect more realistic interdiction scenarios.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. First, in Section 6.1 we describe our
test instances and the implementation issues. Then in Section 6.2 we discuss the obtained
computational results.
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6.1. Preliminaries
Graph structure and costs. The test instances used in our experiments are repre-
sented by three classes of random graphs, specifically, layered, uniform [15] and Barabasi-
Albert (BA) [5] graphs. The test instances are constructed as follows:
• Layered graphs. Each of our random layered graphs consists of h layers with ri nodes
in the i-th layer, where ri for i ∈ {2, . . . , h − 1} is generated according to the discrete
uniform distribution in the interval [rmin, rmax]. The first and last layers consist of a
single node, i.e., r1 = rh = 1 , that are the source and destination nodes, respectively. An
arc between a pair of nodes from the i-th and j-th layers is generated with probability
p
j−i
. Furthermore, the source node is connected by a directed arc to all nodes in layer 2,
while all nodes in layer h − 1 are connected to the destination node. All arc costs are
generated according to the discrete uniform distribution in the interval [0, 100|j − i|]. In
our experiments we set h = 10, rmin = 4, rmax = 6 and p = 0.5.
• Uniform graphs. For each two nodes i and j in the graph, directed arc (i, j) exists with
probability p; see further details on undirected random graphs of this type in [15]. All
arc costs are generated according to the discrete uniform distribution in the interval
[0, 100]. The source and destination nodes are selected as follows. First, given graph
G we compute its diameter, diam(G), and construct a list of all node pairs such that
the distance between the nodes is approximately diam(G)/2. Then a pair of nodes is
chosen from this list uniformly at random to be the source and destination nodes. In our
experiments we set |N | = 50 and p = 0.5.
• BA graphs. These graphs are constructed based on the following preferential attachment
mechanism. Suppose m0 is a number of nodes in the initial complete graph. Then in
each iteration we add a node and connect it with m ≤ m0 existing nodes randomly with
probabilities proportional to their degrees; see further details in [5]. We set |N | = 50,
m = m0 = 5. The arc costs as well as the source and destination nodes are generated in
the same manner as for the uniform random graphs described above.
Initial information for the interdictor. In all our experiments we construct A0 as fol-
lows. For each arc a ∈ A we modify its cost to ca+M with probability 0.5, whereM = 10
4 is suf-
ficiently large. Thus, the arcs with modified costs do not belong to the shortest path from s to f
in the modified graph as long as there exists at least one path that consists of only non-modified
arcs. Then we add all arcs in the resulting shortest path to A0. This procedure is repeated 5
times and hence, A0 consists of arcs that belong to at most 5 distinct paths from s to f .
Feedback types. As outlined above we consider two types of information feedback from
the evader’s action to the interdictor, namely, perfect and noisy feedback. The perfect feedback
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satisfies Assumption A5. The noisy information feedback is generated as follows. Recall that
for each arc a ∈ A0 the interdictor is assumed to know its nominal cost. Then whenever arc
a ∈ A \ A0 is traversed by the evader for the first time instead of ca the interdictor observes a
cost generated according to a uniform distribution from [ca − 0.2ca, ca + 0.2ca].
Computational settings. All experiments were performed on a PC with CPU i5-7200U
and RAM 6 GB. We use the solution approach from [20] to solve the k-most vital arcs problem.
The heuristic for the strategic evader (Algorithm 1) is implemented in Java with CPLEX 12.7.1.
Furthermore, we set α = 0.5 and q = 2 as the heuristic parameters. The intuition behind these
settings can be justified as follows.
Having α = 0.5 implies that the value of δτ in decision epoch τ , see line 10 of Algorithm 1,
is equal to the average loss of the greedy evader over two consecutive decision epochs, namely,
τ and τ +1. Thus, for the strategic evader, whose goal is to outperform the greedy evader over
these two decision epochs, we consider as candidate paths in epoch τ , see line 14, only paths of
sufficiently small cost (less than threshold δτ ). Following our discussion in Section 5, if α < 0.5,
then the algorithm may fail to take into consideration some alternative reasonably good evasion
solutions. On the other hand, if α > 0.5, then in epoch τ the heuristic is forced to consider
evasion paths with sufficiently large costs. It is reasonable to expect that in most cases these
candidate evasion paths in epoch τ lead to inferior evasion solutions over epochs τ and τ + 1.
Finally, as discussed in Section 5 the value of q allows the heuristic to control indirectly
that the evasion decisions by the strategic evader are sufficiently different from those generated
by the greedy evader. From our preliminary experiments not reported here, where we explored
sensitivity of Algorithm 1 with respect to the parameter settings, we conclude that Algorithm 1
with α = 0.5 and q = 2 performs reasonably well for our test instances and provides consistent
computational results.
6.2. Results and Discussion
Measures of performance. Henceforth, we fix a particular class of random graphs as
well as k ∈ {1, . . . , 10} and T ∈ {2, 5, 10}. Then in each experiment Q = 50 test instances,
i.e., random graphs of the specified type, are generated. We denote by χ=(T, k) the percentage
of test instances in a particular experiment, where the performance of the greedy policy and
the proposed heuristic approach coincide, i.e., the evader’s losses obtained by these methods
are the same. Also, denote by χ<(T, k) the percentage of test instances, where the heuristic
outperforms the greedy policy. Note that the percentage of test instances, where the heuristic
approach is outperformed by the greedy policy is given by:
χ>(T, k) = 100− χ<(T, k)− χ=(T, k).
We use χ=, χ< and χ> as the performance measures of the proposed heuristic in Tables 1-6.
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T = 2 T = 5 T = 10
k χ< χ= χ> χ< χ= χ> χ< χ= χ>
1 4.0 (3.3) 96.0 (3.3) 0.0 (0.0) 5.2 (3.8) 94.4 (4.0) 0.4 (0.8) 5.2 (3.8) 94.4 (4.0) 0.4 (0.8)
2 7.0 (5.0) 93.0 (5.0) 0.0 (0.0) 9.2 (3.6) 87.6 (6.1) 3.2 (2.9) 9.8 (4.1) 86.0 (6.4) 4.2 (3.2)
3 9.2 (4.1) 90.8 (4.1) 0.0 (0.0) 18.2 (4.1) 76.4 (3.8) 5.4 (3.2) 24.2 (8.8) 69.6 (7.7) 6.2 (3.4)
4 10.6 (6.2) 89.4 (6.2) 0.0 (0.0) 23.0 (5.2) 68.8 (7.0) 8.2 (5.0) 31.4 (6.3) 53.2 (6.8) 15.4 (6.8)
5 14.2 (5.2) 85.8 (5.2) 0.0 (0.0) 32.2 (8.8) 57.8 (9.8) 10.0 (2.0) 44.2 (4.3) 34.0 (5.7) 21.8 (2.6)
6 15.0 (3.6) 85.0 (3.6) 0.0 (0.0) 37.6 (7.1) 50.8 (8.1) 11.6 (3.9) 45.0 (6.7) 28.0 (5.8) 27.0 (7.1)
7 15.0 (5.8) 85.0 (5.8) 0.0 (0.0) 35.4 (6.3) 53.7 (5.5) 10.9 (6.0) 50.7 (5.2) 26.5 (7.8) 22.8 (6.1)
8 14.2 (3.9) 85.8 (3.9) 0.0 (0.0) 36.6 (8.0) 50.4 (7.5) 13.0 (6.3) 48.6 (4.4) 24.8 (6.2) 26.6 (6.2)
9 16.0 (4.0) 84.0 (4.0) 0.0 (0.0) 42.4 (6.2) 47.4 (5.7) 10.2 (4.9) 57.1 (5.0) 17.3 (3.7) 25.5 (6.2)
10 20.0 (3.1) 80.0 (3.1) 0.0 (0.0) 46.4 (6.2) 42.8 (4.7) 10.8 (3.6) 61.8 (5.4) 14.3 (4.7) 23.9 (5.6)
Table 1: Comparison of the greedy policy against the heuristic for the strategic evader in the layered random
graphs. The interdictor’s feedback is transparent. For each pair of values of k and T , we report the averages
and standard deviations of χ<(T, k), χ=(T, k) and χ>(T, k) over 10 experiments.
T = 2 T = 5 T = 10
k χ< χ= χ> χ< χ= χ> χ< χ= χ>
1 4.0 (2.2) 96.0 (2.2) 0.0 (0.0) 10.0 (3.2) 88.6 (3.0) 1.4 (0.9) 9.0 (3.6) 88.6 (3.0) 2.4 (1.5)
2 10.2 (3.3) 89.8 (3.3) 0.0 (0.0) 21.4 (5.7) 72.2 (7.2) 6.4 (4.1) 26.2 (5.4) 67.4 (6.1) 6.4 (3.4)
3 10.4 (2.8) 89.6 (2.8) 0.0 (0.0) 27.2 (5.5) 66.8 (6.1) 6.0 (3.0) 37.6 (5.5) 51.4 (5.1) 11.0 (3.9)
4 10.2 (4.7) 89.8 (4.7) 0.0 (0.0) 30.6 (5.4) 60.8 (6.9) 8.6 (4.2) 49.6 (5.1) 36.2 (7.0) 14.2 (4.4)
5 13.2 (4.5) 86.8 (4.5) 0.0 (0.0) 32.5 (7.7) 58.1 (7.7) 9.4 (3.0) 48.1 (7.9) 28.8 (4.8) 23.1 (6.0)
6 17.0 (5.0) 83.0 (5.0) 0.0 (0.0) 37.2 (5.0) 52.2 (5.5) 10.6 (6.0) 53.9 (4.6) 21.2 (6.5) 24.9 (4.4)
7 16.8 (5.2) 83.2 (5.2) 0.0 (0.0) 42.8 (5.7) 47.0 (7.4) 10.2 (3.0) 58.4 (4.8) 19.5 (5.8) 22.0 (3.4)
8 18.2 (6.8) 81.8 (6.8) 0.0 (0.0) 42.4 (6.5) 48.8 (8.8) 8.8 (3.0) 57.9 (7.4) 19.2 (6.7) 22.9 (4.8)
9 15.2 (3.7) 84.8 (3.7) 0.0 (0.0) 42.2 (5.6) 45.8 (6.3) 12.0 (4.7) 61.4 (5.0) 16.6 (6.1) 22.0 (6.0)
10 17.0 (4.6) 83.0 (4.6) 0.0 (0.0) 44.8 (5.9) 43.2 (5.5) 12.0 (4.9) 59.5 (4.2) 16.3 (5.1) 24.3 (6.1)
Table 2: Comparison of the greedy policy against the heuristic for the strategic evader in the layered random
graphs. The interdictor’s feedback is noisy. For each pair of values of k and T , we report the averages and
standard deviations of χ<(T, k), χ=(T, k) and χ>(T, k) over 10 experiments.
Specifically, for each class of random graphs described in Section 6.1, k ∈ {1, . . . , 10} and
T ∈ {2, 5, 10}, the experiment is repeated 10 times. Then in Tables 1, 3 and 5 we report
average values and standard deviations with respect to χ<(T, k), χ=(T, k) and χ>(T, k). In
Tables 2, 4 and 6 the same computational results are provided assuming that the feedback is
noisy. Furthermore, in Table 7 we report the average running times of the heuristic algorithm
for each k ∈ {1, . . . , 10} and T = 10.
Finally, in the remainder of the section, whenever we refer to the strategic evader or the
heuristic we imply that the evader uses Algorithm 1 in the iterative manner over the specified
time horizon T (recall that Algorithm 1 computes an evasion decision only for at most two
decision epochs).
Heuristic performance vs. Greedy policy. First, consider the case of T = 2 that
corresponds to the first column in each of the tables. We observe that χ>(2, k) = 0 for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , 10} in all tables. In other words, the strategic evader is always at least as good
as the greedy evader for T = 2. This heuristic performance is expected given that, first,
Algorithm 1 compares possible alternative solutions with a solution of the greedy policy for
two steps ahead; furthermore, whenever the heuristic cannot find a good quality alternative
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T = 2 T = 5 T = 10
k χ< χ= χ> χ< χ= χ> χ< χ= χ>
1 0.8 (1.3) 99.2 (1.3) 0.0 (0.0) 1.2 (1.3) 98.8 (1.3) 0.0 (0.0) 1.2 (1.3) 98.8 (1.3) 0.0 (0.0)
2 4.8 (2.2) 95.2 (2.2) 0.0 (0.0) 6.6 (3.5) 92.0 (2.4) 1.4 (2.4) 6.8 (3.7) 91.8 (2.6) 1.4 (2.4)
3 4.2 (2.6) 95.8 (2.6) 0.0 (0.0) 10.0 (4.5) 88.0 (5.1) 2.0 (1.8) 12.6 (6.0) 84.6 (6.1) 2.8 (2.2)
4 6.2 (1.9) 93.8 (1.9) 0.0 (0.0) 16.6 (6.1) 78.0 (7.4) 5.4 (2.5) 20.2 (4.9) 71.2 (6.3) 8.6 (3.7)
5 6.6 (3.8) 93.4 (3.8) 0.0 (0.0) 16.8 (6.7) 76.2 (5.5) 7.0 (3.3) 24.8 (5.6) 61.4 (5.3) 13.8 (2.3)
6 7.2 (4.2) 92.8 (4.2) 0.0 (0.0) 21.2 (6.7) 72.4 (7.8) 6.4 (4.6) 32.6 (4.9) 50.2 (5.1) 17.2 (6.8)
7 7.0 (2.7) 93.0 (2.7) 0.0 (0.0) 23.2 (6.5) 70.0 (7.0) 6.8 (3.2) 33.8 (6.7) 46.2 (8.5) 20.0 (4.3)
8 7.0 (4.4) 93.0 (4.4) 0.0 (0.0) 25.6 (5.6) 67.2 (4.9) 7.2 (3.6) 37.0 (6.1) 42.0 (6.4) 21.0 (3.0)
9 8.2 (4.3) 91.8 (4.3) 0.0 (0.0) 27.6 (7.0) 62.8 (5.3) 9.6 (4.5) 41.2 (3.6) 40.0 (5.7) 18.8 (5.7)
10 10.8 (3.9) 89.2 (3.9) 0.0 (0.0) 25.8 (8.4) 67.4 (5.9) 6.8 (5.0) 41.6 (6.4) 40.2 (5.7) 18.2 (3.6)
Table 3: Comparison of the greedy policy against the heuristic for the strategic evader in the uniform random
graphs. The interdictor’s feedback is transparent. For each pair of values of k and T , we report the averages
and standard deviations of χ<(T, k), χ=(T, k) and χ>(T, k) over 10 experiments.
T = 2 T = 5 T = 10
k χ< χ= χ> χ< χ= χ> χ< χ= χ>
1 3.0 (2.0) 97.0 (2.0) 0.0 (0.0) 4.2 (2.6) 95.8 (2.6) 0.0 (0.0) 4.2 (2.6) 95.8 (2.6) 0.0 (0.0)
2 3.8 (2.3) 96.2 (2.3) 0.0 (0.0) 8.2 (1.4) 89.8 (1.9) 2.0 (1.8) 9.2 (1.3) 89.0 (2.0) 1.8 (1.7)
3 7.0 (3.5) 93.0 (3.5) 0.0 (0.0) 18.2 (4.2) 78.0 (3.3) 3.8 (2.9) 20.2 (4.2) 72.8 (3.9) 7.0 (3.3)
4 7.0 (3.3) 93.0 (3.3) 0.0 (0.0) 19.4 (5.4) 75.8 (6.0) 4.8 (2.7) 28.8 (3.0) 59.2 (5.3) 12.0 (4.5)
5 8.2 (3.7) 91.8 (3.7) 0.0 (0.0) 22.4 (4.3) 72.6 (5.6) 5.0 (3.9) 33.6 (5.4) 51.8 (5.0) 14.6 (4.6)
6 9.0 (2.9) 91.0 (2.9) 0.0 (0.0) 22.8 (2.6) 69.2 (4.4) 8.0 (4.0) 36.4 (6.8) 45.6 (7.5) 18.0 (5.0)
7 7.4 (4.6) 92.6 (4.6) 0.0 (0.0) 21.8 (4.2) 71.0 (5.0) 7.2 (2.4) 33.4 (3.5) 46.4 (6.2) 20.2 (6.1)
8 11.2 (4.7) 88.8 (4.7) 0.0 (0.0) 27.0 (5.6) 65.4 (5.9) 7.6 (2.2) 42.2 (5.2) 38.2 (4.2) 19.6 (5.9)
9 10.6 (4.4) 89.4 (4.4) 0.0 (0.0) 28.0 (6.2) 64.6 (4.4) 7.4 (3.9) 45.6 (5.4) 35.8 (7.0) 18.6 (3.0)
10 11.4 (2.7) 88.6 (2.7) 0.0 (0.0) 27.8 (4.4) 63.2 (4.7) 9.0 (2.2) 41.8 (10.5) 38.2 (10.0) 20.0 (5.9)
Table 4: Comparison of the greedy policy against the heuristic for the strategic evader in the uniform random
graphs. The interdictor’s feedback is noisy. For each pair of values of k and T , we report the averages and
standard deviations of χ<(T, k), χ=(T, k) and χ>(T, k) over 10 experiments.
solution, then the heuristic resorts to the greedy policy solution.
Next, it is worth highlighting that the values of both χ>(T, 1) and χ<(T, 1) are rather small
for all test instances, i.e., the strategic evader almost always selects a greedy evasion solution
when the interdictor blocks exactly one arc. This observation can be explained by Proposition 1,
where we show that for T = 2, A0 = ∅ and k = 1 the greedy policy is optimal (recall that in
our test instances A0 6= ∅). Thus, we can expect that greedy evasion solutions are often close to
optimal for k = 1 whenever |A0| is sufficiently small. Also, the aforementioned trend is less pro-
nounced for instances with noisy feedback (if one compares the results for χ>(T, 1) in Tables 1,
3 and 5 against those in Tables 2, 4 and 6 , respectively), which is also reasonable to expect.
For a fixed value of k, the value of χ<(T, k) tends to grow with the increase in T . In other
words, the number of instances, where the heuristic outperforms the greedy policy increases.
This observation is intuitive given that as the number of decision epochs increases there are
more opportunities for the strategic evader to improve her performance.
On the other hand, we observe that the value of χ>(T, k) also increases with T . For example,
for k = 4 in Table 1, χ>(T, 4) monotonously increases from 0 to 15.4. It implies that as T
increases there exist instances, where the greedy policy outperforms the proposed heuristic.
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T = 2 T = 5 T = 10
k χ< χ= χ> χ< χ= χ> χ< χ= χ>
1 2.4 (2.2) 97.6 (2.2) 0.0 (0.0) 3.2 (2.4) 96.2 (2.7) 0.6 (1.8) 3.2 (2.4) 96.2 (2.7) 0.6 (1.8)
2 6.2 (3.8) 93.8 (3.8) 0.0 (0.0) 13.0 (6.9) 85.0 (7.1) 2.0 (2.5) 13.0 (6.8) 84.8 (6.8) 2.2 (2.6)
3 9.4 (4.0) 90.6 (4.0) 0.0 (0.0) 21.2 (6.1) 73.8 (5.3) 5.0 (3.1) 26.2 (6.5) 67.8 (7.3) 6.0 (2.5)
4 15.0 (4.2) 85.0 (4.2) 0.0 (0.0) 29.2 (6.7) 59.6 (6.4) 11.2 (4.2) 38.4 (5.6) 43.0 (6.6) 18.6 (5.3)
5 17.2 (3.2) 82.8 (3.2) 0.0 (0.0) 34.6 (7.6) 53.9 (7.7) 11.6 (4.1) 40.0 (12.0) 37.6 (13.6) 22.4 (10.6)
6 16.2 (5.2) 83.8 (5.2) 0.0 (0.0) 44.1 (6.0) 47.0 (6.0) 8.9 (3.0) 43.1 (7.7) 29.7 (9.5) 27.2 (10.4)
7 14.8 (4.2) 85.2 (4.2) 0.0 (0.0) 37.5 (8.1) 48.5 (7.4) 14.1 (5.0) 52.3 (10.6) 24.6 (7.7) 23.1 (10.8)
8 17.2 (3.5) 82.8 (3.5) 0.0 (0.0) 47.5 (6.6) 40.3 (5.8) 12.2 (4.9) 56.0 (9.1) 23.4 (8.1) 20.7 (9.8)
9 19.2 (4.9) 80.8 (4.9) 0.0 (0.0) 44.4 (6.2) 41.1 (4.2) 14.6 (3.9) 52.1 (14.4) 22.8 (7.2) 25.1 (12.5)
10 15.8 (4.3) 84.2 (4.3) 0.0 (0.0) 39.7 (7.1) 47.3 (6.7) 13.0 (2.4) 57.8 (19.4) 19.7 (14.0) 22.4 (8.9)
Table 5: Comparison of the greedy policy against the heuristic for the strategic evader in the BA random
graphs. The interdictor’s feedback is transparent. For each pair of values of k and T , we report the averages
and standard deviations of χ<(T, k), χ=(T, k) and χ>(T, k) over 10 experiments.
T = 2 T = 5 T = 10
k χ< χ= χ> χ< χ= χ> χ< χ= χ>
1 3.2 (2.2) 96.8 (2.2) 0.0 (0.0) 5.4 (2.7) 94.0 (2.7) 0.6 (0.9) 5.4 (2.7) 94.0 (2.7) 0.6 (0.9)
2 7.0 (4.2) 93.0 (4.2) 0.0 (0.0) 17.8 (6.3) 79.2 (6.1) 3.0 (1.8) 17.6 (4.9) 77.8 (6.1) 4.6 (2.7)
3 9.2 (4.2) 90.8 (4.2) 0.0 (0.0) 28.0 (4.1) 66.8 (6.8) 5.2 (4.8) 35.8 (5.2) 55.0 (7.4) 9.2 (3.9)
4 12.6 (3.4) 87.4 (3.4) 0.0 (0.0) 31.0 (10.2) 59.8 (11.6) 9.2 (5.1) 46.8 (8.4) 37.4 (10.3) 15.8 (3.9)
5 16.2 (4.9) 83.8 (4.9) 0.0 (0.0) 40.3 (4.8) 50.5 (5.5) 9.2 (2.7) 48.2 (6.7) 30.3 (5.9) 21.5 (8.7)
6 16.6 (5.0) 83.4 (5.0) 0.0 (0.0) 38.7 (8.9) 49.2 (8.0) 12.1 (4.4) 50.6 (6.9) 24.3 (8.2) 25.1 (7.4)
7 16.2 (5.1) 83.8 (5.1) 0.0 (0.0) 43.8 (3.2) 45.2 (7.2) 11.0 (4.5) 56.0 (12.8) 17.9 (7.0) 26.1 (9.2)
8 18.2 (5.0) 81.8 (5.0) 0.0 (0.0) 44.4 (7.0) 43.9 (6.1) 11.7 (5.0) 52.1 (7.8) 17.6 (7.9) 30.3 (8.3)
9 20.8 (6.7) 79.2 (6.7) 0.0 (0.0) 46.9 (5.7) 39.8 (6.0) 13.3 (2.3) 52.3 (15.2) 17.0 (8.3) 30.7 (10.8)
10 17.6 (6.4) 82.4 (6.4) 0.0 (0.0) 43.4 (6.6) 44.3 (7.6) 12.3 (4.4) 54.4 (16.9) 17.6 (13.0) 28.0 (13.7)
Table 6: Comparison of the greedy policy against the heuristic for the strategic evader in the BA random graphs.
The interdictor’s feedback is noisy. For each pair of values of k and T , we report the averages and standard
deviations of χ<(T, k), χ=(T, k) and χ>(T, k) over 10 experiments.
This fact is also not surprising if one recalls that the heuristic is myopic as it computes evasion
decisions only for at most two decision epochs by applying Algorithm 1 in the iterative manner.
Nevertheless, in all cases we have that χ<(T, k) > χ>(T, k) on average, which implies that
the evader should prefer using the heuristic than the greedy policy. Note that χ=(T, k) (i.e.,
the number of instances where the performances of the approaches coincide) decreases as T
increases, which is natural given the above discussion.
Furthermore, observe that for fixed T with the increase of k, the value of χ<(T, k) tends to
grow, while χ=(T, k) tends to decrease. The latter observation can be explained as follows. As
we point out in Section 4, if parameter k is sufficiently large, then the optimal evasion solution
is likely to be arc-disjoint (recall Remark 1). However, an optimal pair of arc-disjoint paths
usually does not coincide with the greedy evasion solution; recall Examples 1 and 2.
Finally, when comparing the results Tables 1, 3 and 5 against those in Tables 2, 4 and 6 ,
respectively, we conclude that the above observations hold for both perfect and noisy feedback
settings (recall that the latter relaxes Assumption A5 used in our derivations of the theoretical
results in Section 3 and 4). In other words, in scenarios where the interdictor does not have
the perfect information about the evader’s actions the heuristic performs sufficiently well.
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k Layered graphs Uniform graphs BA graphs
1 0.06 0.08 0.06
2 0.2 0.21 0.2
3 0.5 0.39 0.42
4 0.97 0.61 0.72
5 1.49 0.84 0.9
6 1.72 0.81 0.87
7 1.93 0.74 0.88
8 2.07 0.72 0.82
9 2.02 0.7 0.62
10 1.52 0.67 0.53
Table 7: The average running times (in seconds) of the heuristic algorithm for the strategic evader (Algorithm 1)
applied for T = 10 and k ∈ {1, . . . , 10}.
Running time. Note that the running time of the heuristic algorithm initially increases and
then tends to decrease with the increase of parameter k, see Table 7. Clearly, if k is sufficiently
small, then the k-most vital arcs problem can be solved fast and thus, the total running time
of Algorithm 1 decreases. Alternatively, the larger the value of parameter k is, the more
information the evader is forced to reveal to the interdictor in each decision epoch. Once the
interdictor finds an optimal solution of the k-most vital arcs problem in the full information
network, then the interdictor keeps implementing the same solution in each decision epoch,
see [6] for more details. Thus, as the heuristic is myopic, then it also does not change the
evasion solutions in the corresponding decision epochs. Hence, for sufficiently large values of
parameter k most of the computational efforts of the heuristic algorithm are restricted to the
first few decision epochs.
Summary. To conclude, the proposed heuristic approach for the strategic evader outper-
forms in general the greedy evasion policy. Moreover, despite its myopic two-step look ahead
structure our approach can be successfully applied even for rather large values of parameter T
and any set of initial information available to the interdictor. Finally, we note that the obtained
results are pretty consistent with respect to all considered classes of random graphs and types
of the information feedback obtained by the interdictor from the evader’s actions.
7. Conclusions
In this study, we consider a class of sequential interdiction settings where the interdictor has
incomplete initial information about the network while the evader has complete knowledge of
the network including its structure and arc costs. However, by observing the evader’s actions,
the interdictor learns about the network structure and costs and thus, can adjust his actions
in subsequent decision epochs.
Our focus is on the evader’s perspective. In particular, we assume that the interdictor acts
in a greedy manner, by blocking k arcs known to him in each round. Such interdiction policies
are known from the literature, see [6, 7], to perform well against greedy evaders who traverse
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along the shortest path in the non-interdicted network in each round. In this paper, our goal
is to explore whether the evader can improve her performance by acting in a strategic manner.
Specifically, we first show that the evader’s problem is computationally hard even for two
decision epochs. Then we derive basic constructive properties of optimal evasion policies for two
decision epochs when the interdictor has no initial information about the network structure.
Furthermore, based on these observations, we design a heuristic algorithm for a strategic evader
in a general setting with an arbitrary time horizon and any initial information available to the in-
terdictor. Our computational experiments demonstrate that the proposed heuristic consistently
outperforms the greedy evasion policy on several classes of synthetic network instances with re-
spect to various sets of initial information and types of the feedback available to the interdictor.
The insights (both from theoretical and practical perspectives) from our results can be
summarized as follows. First, our heuristic algorithm is based on a two-step look-ahead idea.
Thus, whenever the interdictor is myopic the evaders can significantly improve their performance
over multiple decision epochs in a rather simple manner, i.e., by considering only two consecutive
decision epochs instead of one in the greedy (i.e., myopic) evasion approach. Furthermore, for
the aforementioned two consecutive epochs it may be sufficient for the evader to consider two
simple decision strategies. Either the evader should follow a myopic shortest-path based policy
or seek only two alternative paths that have some arcs in common with greedy evasion paths
in the network. Also, for the latter case the evasion paths in consequent decision epochs often
need to be arc-disjoint, which is also rather intuitive from the real-life perspective (e.g., in
“infiltration” or “smuggling” scenarios).
Another interesting observation (with possible practical implications) from our computa-
tional study is that strategic evasion decisions are more beneficial when the interdictor has more
resources. In other words, the more arcs can be blocked by the interdictor in each decision epoch
the faster he forces the greedy evader to reveal new network information, which subsequently can
be exploited to improve the interdiction decisions. Thus, in such scenarios the evaders need to
follow more sophisticated policies in order to improve their performance. Moreover, this obser-
vation also suggests that the availability of more interdiction resources do not necessarily imply
that the interdictor may simply rely on myopic policies. From the practical perspective, the
increase in the interdiction resources may force the evader to switch to strategic evasions, which
in turn decreases the efficiency of myopic interdiction policies and consequently may require
from the interdictor implementation of non-myopic decisions. On the other hand, for instances
where the interdictor’s resources are limited greedy evasions can be close to optimal, which im-
plies that the evaders may simplify their decisions over multiple epochs. Then the interdictor
may also consider relying on myopic policies as they perform well against greedy evaders.
With respect to future research directions, it would be interesting to study a setting, where
the decision-makers operate in a stochastic environment, see, e.g., related works in [4, 10] for
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the analysis of different types of feedback in a classical multi-armed bandit setting. Moreover,
in our study we assume that the evader observes the blocking decision before choosing a path
and knows the interdictor’s budget. Therefore, one may explore the evader’s problem with this
assumption relaxed. For example, the study in [33] considers a class of interdiction problems
where at every node in the evader’s path the interdictor must decide whether or not to expand
the interdiction set.
Finally, in this paper our major goal is to gain insights about the evasion policies that could
be effective against interdictors who assume simplistic greedy evasion policies. In view of the
discussion above, we envision that the results and observations of this study can be further ex-
ploited for the development of advanced interdiction models, where the evader may follow more
sophisticated evasion policies than those that are typically assumed in the related literature.
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